On Sept. 16, the blockbuster film The Founding of a Republic was released to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, which occurs Thursday, Oct. 1. Featuring more than 100 big-name mainland and Hong Kong actors including Jackie Chan and Jet Li, one of the more poignant moments occurs when the actor playing Mao Zedong holds back tears and emotionally proclaims on the eve of the rise of a new and independent country, "The Chinese people have stood up." The film then awkwardly hurries forward to December 1978, when Deng Xiaoping heralds the era of "opening and reform" in the Middle Kingdom.

It is undoubtedly a propaganda film, as would be expected of anything conceived by the Beijing Municipal People's Political Consultative Conference. But the ambitious sweep of events over six decades is a reminder of something else: The reform period since Deng took power will be nearing the completion of its 31st year -- more than half the age of modern China.

This is significant because China's leaders since Deng have been telling the world that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will soon relinquish its dominance over the Chinese economy and society, and is assiduously laying the groundwork for fundamental economic and political reform, and eventually democracy -- but only after it recovers from the chaos and destruction of the Mao years. After all, Deng famously declared that democracy was "a major condition that emancipated the mind." But the reform period of 31 years has exceeded Mao's 27 years of terrible rule. The excuse that the party will "let go" its economic and political power but for the ghost of Mao and his terrible legacy is wearing thin.

So, first things first. Why should the party "let go" more power and instead work toward building institutions that will aid political reform and eventually democracy in China? Because in one important respect, authoritarian China is failing: While the Chinese state is rich and the party powerful, civil society is weak and the vast majority of people remain poor.

But aren't China's leaders doing a magnificent job of at least leading the country toward prosperity? After all, since Deng's reforms, Chinese GDP has grown 16-fold. And isn't this ultimately for the benefit of most of the country's people? Not in China's model of investment-led state corporatism hatched after the 1989 Tiananmen protests to preserve the economic power and relevance of the party.

Surprisingly, the greatest contributor to Chinese growth since the 1990s is not net exports but domestically funded fixed investment used to buy machinery or construct buildings and infrastructure such as roads and bridges. For example, this constituted more than half of GDP in 2008 and more than 45 percent of GDP growth in that year. Due to this year's massive $586 billion stimulus, about 75 percent of growth this year -- now touching 8 percent -- has been achieved through state-led fixed investment.

But not just the high reliance on fixed investment is striking. Where the capital goes is also all important. China is unusual in that bank loans -- drawn from its citizens' deposits funneled into state-controlled banks -- constitute about 80 percent of all investment activity in the country. Although state-controlled enterprises produce between one-quarter and one-third of the country's output, they receive more than three-quarters of the country's capital, and the figure is rising. Revealingly, state-controlled enterprises received more than 95 percent of the 2009 stimulus money. The Chinese state sector currently owns at least two-thirds of all fixed assets in the country.

Economic growth in poor countries is meaningful if it manages to raise the standard of living of the majority of citizens. But predominantly state-led models for growth, as in China, usually lead to profound structural inequalities that are difficult to resolve.

Tellingly, China's 50 million to 200 million-person middle class (depending on how we define the term) is the strongest supporter of the party, which is about 75 million strong. These elites comprise the fastest-growing groups wanting to become party members, almost a quarter of whom are professionals and skilled workers, a third students, and another third successful businesspeople. Joining the party has become a lucrative career move. By controlling the most important industries and the bulk of the country's capital (through state-owned banks), as well as by overseeing an extensive system of awards, promotions, and regulation, the CCP continues to control and dispense a dominant share of the country's most valued economic, professional, and intellectual opportunities.

Meanwhile, about 1 billion people are missing out on the fruits of prosperity. The country's "bottom billion" are outsiders to China's state-led model of development. They have little prospect of rising up and suffer under the yoke of frequently corrupt and incompetent rule by China's 45 million local officials. For example, according to a 2005 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences report, more than 40 million households have had their lands illegally seized by corrupt and unaccountable local officials over the past decade. In the 1990s, poverty alleviation slowed dramatically, and since 2000, the numbers of those still in poverty actually doubled in absolute terms. In one generation, China has gone from being the most equal to the most unequal country in all Asia.

It was not always like this. Eighty percent of the hundreds of millions of Chinese who have escaped poverty did so in the first 10 years of reform leading up to the 1989 Tiananmen protests -- before the state retook control of the economy. Across the board, incomes were rising with the tide. There was a decrease in the numbers, discretionary powers, and duties of local officials. Private businesses were outperforming even the best state-controlled ones, and an independent middle class was growing and thriving. Then came Tiananmen, and Beijing halted reforms and changed direction. (Predictably, all of this is left out in The Founding of a Republic.)

The planned celebrations in Beijing and other cities will no doubt be spectacular. But as the planned military parade, showcasing five types of domestically designed missiles, and other festivities take place, the power of the state will also be on show. There will be a huge People's Armed Police and People's Liberation Army contingent there just in case protesters make an appearance. Snipers will line the tops of buildings along the designated parade path. October 1 will demonstrate the party's success in holding onto power and the strength and wealth of the Chinese state, but not that of its people.

China needs to build institutions -- and especially promote the rule of law, accountability, and transparency -- and the state needs to take its hands off the levers of economic power. The party knows full well that these conditions will likely lead to political reform and are therefore resisting change. But if that occurs, then the Chinese people -- and not just the state -- will have much more to celebrate next time.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/28/the_partys_not_over?page=full

Sixty years ago Mao Zedong stood before a sea of people atop Tiananmen Gate proclaiming, in his high-pitched Hunan dialect, the founding of the People's Republic of China and that the "Chinese people have stood up!" The moment was marked with pride and hope. The communists' victory had vanquished the Nationalist regime, withstood the vicious onslaught of the Japanese invasion and overturned the century of foreign encroachment on China's territory. Moreover, Mao and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to power without significant external support — theirs was largely a homegrown revolution.

Mao brought a vision for China that has resonated from the 19th century Qing dynasty reformers to this day: to regain China's fu qiang (wealth and power), dignity, international respect and territorial integrity. In this regard, Mao and the CCP positioned themselves squarely with a deep yearning among Chinese — thus earning their loyalty and the party's legitimacy. His successors have not wavered from this singular vision and mission. (Read "Where China Goes Next.")

Tragically, Mao's belief in restoring China's greatness and achieving modernity was inextricably intertwined with his ideological desire to transform China into a socialist and revolutionary society. Mao's social engineering continually convulsed China in unrelenting political campaigns. These movements disrupted productivity and caused horrific loss of life. Yet, despite the chaos, the People's Republic embarked on industrialization and stood up. By many measures, 60 years on, China has achieved significant progress toward becoming a major and global power. Mao may recognize it, but he would not be wholly happy with it.

As the People's Republic of China commemorates its 60th anniversary, it seemingly has much to celebrate. China is the world's most populous and industrious nation, is the world's third largest economy and trading nation, has become a global innovator in science and technology, and is building a world-class university system. It has an increasingly modern military and commands diplomatic respect. It is at peace with its neighbors and all major powers. Its hybrid model of quasi-state capitalism and semidemocratic authoritarianism — sometimes dubbed the "Beijing Consensus" — has attracted attention across the developing world.

This growing soft power of China was strengthened by the 2008 Olympics extravaganza, and the Shanghai Expo next year will similarly dazzle. The 60th anniversary celebration in Beijing on Oct. 1 will impress, if not frighten, the world with an arresting display of military hardware and goose-stepping soldiers. Less visible is the fact that China is the first major economy to recover from the global recession and, indeed, is leading the world out of it. (Read "Mission Accomplished. Now What?")

China is on a roll, particularly when viewed over time. Visiting or living in China every year over the past three decades, I have had the personal opportunity to witness dramatic transformations. When I first went to China in 1979, vestiges of the Cultural Revolution were still evident: revolutionary slogans painted on walls and pockmarks on university buildings from bullets and howitzer shells shot by dueling Red Guards. Camouflaged, but just as evident, were the personal scars borne by intellectuals and officials whom I met at the time. I heard stories of beatings and humiliations, confiscations of personal possessions and loss of living quarters, and forced hard labor.

I then witnessed the dramatic blossoming of personal freedoms and economic growth in the 1980s, punctuated by periodic countercampaigns launched by neo-Maoists in the leadership. One could literally feel and see Chinese society come alive after its long Maoist trauma, only to have people quickly recoil when the conservatives in the leadership reasserted themselves. This seesaw pattern persisted throughout the decade, culminating in the dramatic Tiananmen demonstrations and their suppression in June 1989.

In the early 1990s, I again experienced China as a society traumatized, this time by the aftermath of Tiananmen. But by mid-decade Deng Xiaoping had reignited domestic economic reforms and China had normalized its place in the world after its post-Tiananmen isolation. Politics, however, remained frozen and the heavy hand of the state remained evident. Only during the present decade, in the waning years of Jiang Zemin's rule and under Hu Jintao, has the Communist Party begun to experiment with very limited political reforms. My discussions with those party officials involved with crafting the "democratic" reforms makes clear that there are strict boundaries to how far they will proceed.

Thus, when considering the totality of six decades, the record of the PRC is decidedly mixed. While its achievements have been momentous, so are the contrasts and contradictions exposed by those very same achievements. In many sectors, each reform breeds new problems and challenges. China has come a long way, but it still has a long way to go.

See pictures of Remembering Tiananmen Square.

The Cost of Wealth

The question for China's leaders was never whether to modernize — but how. During the Maoist era a variety of economic models were experimented with, each of which achieving some modicum of growth. Yet all of them left China lagging far behind the West and East Asia. The costs of some initiatives, like the Great Leap Forward from 1958 to 1960, were catastrophic in human and environmental terms. It was not until Deng and Chen Yun, another reform-minded Politburo member, returned to power in 1978 from internal exile that the economic course was changed.

Three decades later, the world witnesses the extraordinary results. China is now the world's third largest economy, after the U.S. and Japan, and recently surpassed Germany as the largest exporting nation. Its GNP is on course to overtake Japan's by 2010 and perhaps that of the U.S. by 2020. (Read "Why the China-U.S. Trade Dispute Is Heating Up.")

Much of this dynamic growth has been export-driven, benefiting the low- and medium-technology sectors of the economy. But China is beginning to move up the technological ladder and is becoming more innovative in certain sectors such as electronics and biotechnology. The country has become a manufacturing superpower and the workshop of the world, producing two-thirds of all photocopiers, microwaves and shoes; 60% of cell phones; 55% of DVDs; over half of all digital cameras; 30% of personal computers; and 75% of children's toys, plus a wide variety of other goods.

As a result of its economic boom, China has amassed a staggering $2 trillion in foreign exchange — the largest reserves in the world — and is beginning to invest significant amounts abroad. Today, 37 Chinese multinational corporations rank among FORTUNE's top 500 global companies, up from just six a decade ago, while 450 out of the FORTUNE 500 American companies have production lines and a business presence in China. China has become the world's largest recipient of foreign direct investment. To fuel its economic boom, China's voracious and insatiable appetite for raw materials has led it to absorb large amounts of global commodities. China now consumes 16% of global energy resources and is the world's third largest consumer of oil. (Read "Can China Save the World's Economy?")

But the economic explosion has come at a high environmental cost. China's air and water are among the most polluted on earth and it is the leading emitter of greenhouse gases. The environmental nightmare is hurting public health. Malignant cancer now accounts for 28.5% of deaths while respiratory diseases account for 13.1%, according to the 2008 China Statistical Yearbook. China's growth has been dynamic, but it is also double-edged.

Reinventing a Nation

Mao spent his lifetime trying to transform Chinese society in his utopian, socialist and revolutionary vision. He tried to create a "new socialist man" and an equitable society. His regime succeeded in providing the world's largest population with food to eat, housing and basic services. Social vices were eliminated, literacy was expanded, life expectancy increased and infant mortality decreased. These were no small achievements. But Mao's efforts to impose socialism had a deadening effect on urban and rural society alike, as political movements repeatedly harassed different groups of people.

By the time Deng and his compatriots came to power in 1978, China was traumatized, tired and alienated by 30 years of Maoist experiments and totalitarian controls. Deng's wisdom was to recognize that the state needed to retreat from society and the economy if the creative and entrepreneurial spirits of ordinary Chinese were to be unleashed.

Three decades later, Chinese society has fully blossomed. Chinese today experience a wide variety of personal freedoms in daily life that they and their ancestors had never known. Chinese state and society have also reconnected with the past, emphasizing Confucian and Buddhist values. More than 200 million people have been lifted out of poverty and the members of a growing middle class with disposable income travel abroad, invest in the stock market, dine out and decorate their stylish apartments with furniture purchased from stores like Ikea. Access to education has become far more widespread. Some 21 million students attend university today, while an estimated 300,000 study abroad every year. Approximately 206 million Chinese children attend primary and secondary schools. Basic literacy is almost universal in China today, while it was roughly 20% in 1949. Still, China remains a poor country by global standards: some 207 million people still live below World Bank poverty levels on less than $1.25 per day.

See pictures of China's infrastructure boom.

With economic growth have come demographic shifts and life improvements. Live expectancy has shot up while infant mortality has plummeted. In 1949 more than 90% of the population lived in rural areas; given the expansion of urban areas, slightly more than half (721 million) do today, according to official statistics. But China's increasing urbanization and spreading industrialization have resulted in a considerable loss of arable land and forcible evictions, sparking much resentment against local officials.

Chinese intellectual life has also improved, although over time this remains one of the real dark spots of Chinese communist rule. For six decades intellectuals have been persecuted, harassed and forced to conform and create within various boundaries set by the state. They continually probe the boundaries — until the state pushes back. Despite continuing controls, public and private discourse in China has never been so free. The blogosphere and Internet are alive with unbridled discussion — unless and until it crosses the state censor's invisible hand. (Read "Avoiding Censors, Chinese Authors Go Online.")

While China has made much progress, it still has many blemishes. Treatment of ethnic minorities — particularly Tibetans and Uighurs — is the Achilles' heel of the regime, as violent riots last year and in recent months have clearly demonstrated. Crime and corruption remain serious problems, while cities struggle to provide basic services to the huge "floating population" of 100 million or so migrants. Income disparities (as measured by the Gini coefficient) are now approaching the highest in the world. China has again become a stratified society — just what Mao sought to eliminate. Still, given the unprecedented scale and nature of China's socioeconomic change over the past 30 years, the country's relative stability is commendable.

Politics Not as Usual

At first glance, China's political system has not changed much since 1949. It is still a Leninist system, dominated by the CCP and an oligarchy of its self-selected leaders, which tolerates no opposition. The Party's powerful Organization Department oversees all major appointments in the country, and one must really be a party member to get ahead professionally. Party and government organs remain essentially as they were six decades ago, copied from the Soviet Union.

But while much of the structure and essential nature of the system remains largely the same, the substance and process of politics has changed quite a lot. The leadership and the 76 million party members are better educated and their recruitment and promotion is much more meritocratic. Competence is now rewarded. In the past, there existed only two exit paths from officialdom: purges and death. Now mandatory retirement is firmly implemented. Instead of being a totalitarian party dominated by a single leader, the CCP today is an authoritarian party with a collective leadership. The leaders themselves — at least those I have witnessed — are now remarkably self-assured and relatively sophisticated. Marxist-Leninist ideology plays little, if any, role in their decision-making. The policy process is more consultative, although still lacking in transparency. Much emphasis is put on governance and officials at all levels undergo required training in public administration.

On the whole, the Communist Party has proven itself to be remarkably adaptable and open to borrowing elements from different countries and political systems. As a result it is becoming a hybrid party with elements of East Asian neo-authoritarianism, Latin American corporatism and European social democracy all grafted to Confucianist-Leninist roots. The uprising in Tiananmen and across China in 1989 and the subsequent collapse of communist systems in Europe and the Soviet Union were instructive experiences for the CCP. Many lessons were drawn, but the principal one was to remain flexible and adaptable, not dogmatic and rigid. (Read "Beijing Clamps Down After Call for Democracy.")

Will the Party's adaptability and the nation's continuing economic growth be sufficient to sustain it in power indefinitely? Perhaps. The CCP's sustenance to date has certainly surprised many leading China watchers. But, going forward, the major challenge to the Party will likely be its ability to deliver adequate "public goods" to the population: health care, education, environmental protection and other social services. Providing stability and ever increasing personal wealth will not be enough to guarantee the Party indefinite legitimacy — it must continuously improve the quality of life of its citizens. This is China's new revolution: the revolution of rising expectations.

Taking On the World

Any consideration of China's transformation since 1949 must recognize the dramatic improvement in China's global posture. Sixty years ago the new People's Republic was cut off from the world, having diplomatic recognition only from a relatively small number of nations. It was excluded from the U.N. It soon became embroiled in the Korean War and the Cold War, which brought further isolation. Despite some marginal trade with Western Europe following the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina, China was cut off from international trade, finance and aid. As a result, its economy stagnated.

See pictures of "China Goes to Africa."

Six decades later, China has fully embraced globalization at home and has burst onto the world's stage in a largely positive fashion. It now has both interests and a presence in parts of the world completely new to China — such as Latin America and the Middle East — and enjoys rising international prestige. Beijing has generally managed its relations well with the major world powers: the U.S., Russia and the E.U. It has transformed its regional diplomacy in Asia, reasserted a role in Africa and become much more deeply engaged with international organizations and across a range of global-governance issues. China used to eschew multilateralism, distrusting it as some kind of (Western) conspiracy. While Beijing remains a selective multilateralist globally — engaging on some issues and not others — the broad trend has been positive and in the direction of deeper contributions to the world community.

China is also more proactive on global security issues ("hot spots" as Chinese analysts like to describe them). When natural disasters now strike, such as the South and Southeast Asian tsunami in 2004 and the Pakistan earthquake the following year, China is there to provide physical and financial assistance. China now has over 2,100 peacekeeping personnel deployed in about a dozen nations worldwide — more than any other member of the U.N. Security Council. This is one tangible expression of China's strong commitment to the U.N. Today, indeed, the PRC may be the greatest advocate of the U.N. among the major powers. (Read "China Takes on the World.")

In the field of arms control, China used to be a serious proliferator of missiles and missile components, and a significant seller of conventional arms. But, over time, China has signed or ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Biological and Conventional Weapons Convention, has joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group and has essentially adhered to the Missile Technology Control Regime (although it is not a member). This is not the China that the world used to know: a "revisionist" destabilizing power that sought to overturn the international order. Today, the People's Republic of China is deeply involved across the globe and is increasingly an upholder of, and contributor to, the existing international order. China has been a considerable beneficiary of the post – Cold War order, which has allowed Beijing to establish a presence in regions and international institutions that was not previously possible.

China's strategic posture is also changing. Its military modernization program has made giant strides in recent years — and they will be on display in the massive military parade in central Beijing on Oct. 1. In many categories China's military is the best in Asia and in some sectors is approaching NATO standards. The People's Liberation Army still has no global strike capacity, however, other than its intercontinental ballistic missiles and cyberwarfare capabilities.

Still, many countries worry about China's rise and global expansion, even though it has, to date, been outwardly peaceful. Public opinion polls in Europe and the U.S. regularly reflect a negative image of China, while concerns over economic competition and job losses are growing in Europe, Africa and Latin America. Substantial strains remain in Beijing's ties with three of China's most important neighbors: Australia, India and Japan. Even relations with Russia, which have achieved historic highs since the collapse of the Soviet Union, have run into obstacles. This is unsurprising. As Beijing expands its influence and begins to flex its new muscle on the world stage, it's to be expected that China will engender occasional discord with other nations. (Read "The China-India Rivalry: Watching the Border.")

Future Shock?

Some historians of China think they see the telltale signs of dynastic decline: government corruption, social discontent (especially in the countryside), autocratic rulers and a militarizing state. Some contemporary China experts also voice their doubts — proclaiming the regime fragile and the political system ossified — while economists question how long the dynamic growth can continue.

While the system and country have weaknesses and challenges, the Sinological landscape is littered with its naysayers and critics. The People's Republic of China has endured for six decades and has overcome a wide variety of serious domestic crises, border wars and international isolation. Its strengths and adaptability have repeatedly been underestimated by outside observers. One thing is certain: China will remain a country of complexity and contradictions — which will keep China watchers and Chinese alike guessing about its future indefinitely.

Shambaugh is professor and director of the China Policy Program at George Washington University in Washington, D.C., nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, and currently a visiting scholar at the China Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing. His latest book is China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation

See pictures of China on the wild side.

Find this article at:

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1924366,00.html

周 日的六四遊行，有破紀錄的 8,000人參加。這不是值得高興的事。明天六四燭光集會，不管有多少人參加，也不是值得高興的事。因為環顧世界，只有香港人在孤獨地紀念六四，在追悼六 四，在為枉死者而泣，在為受難者禱告，在要求中國當權者為六四翻案，並期望以此為起點，讓中國向政治改革邁步，走向自由民主法治的國家。

曾為六四 事件而反對她丈夫克林頓在天安門接受官方歡迎儀式的希拉莉，到北京訪問不提中國人權問題了。曾在天安門拉起橫額的美國眾議院議長佩洛西，最近訪北京不提六 四了。仍在北京訪問的美國財長蓋特納恐已忘記中國有人權問題了。我們可以期望奧巴馬會對中國說甚麼呢？每年六四都發表文章或談話的台灣馬英九，去年當選總 統後六四不再提「血腥鎮壓」，據稱明天他會有專文發表，我們能對他有甚麼期待呢？

人民不會忘記？中國大陸的人民真的不會忘記？他們記得三反、五 反、大饑荒、文革嗎？中國人是馴服的（也可以說是過份善良）的民族，是好了傷疤忘了痛的民族，是日子過得好一點就對既往痛楚選擇失憶的民族，除非掌權者要 他們記住比如南京大屠殺那樣的事件。中共建政六十年以來的所有歷史記載都是掌權者撰寫的「當代史」。

面對全世界幾乎都對六四失憶的情勢，中國掌權者會自以為得道多助嗎？但實際上只是「得錢多助」吧了。各國政要對六四選擇沉默是「睇錢份上」，若拿出他們心中的價值觀，或讓他們私下談，他們的真正想法決不是這樣。

在 「得錢多助」的世界，偏偏有一個地方的人，不被金錢收買，他們就是已回歸中國的香港人。每年六四，香港都有數萬市民，在維園點起悼念的燭光，今年是六四二 十周年，也許會有更多人走向維園。是因為曾蔭權的言論起了反面動員作用嗎？也許是的。但參加燭光集會的市民都知道，事情並不像 03年五十萬人上街那樣，人多就可以把事情改變。我們去維園，是因為要對這件駭人的屠殺繼續發聲，是因為我們無法抹去記憶，是因為我們不能捂住良心過日 子。我們曾有過一段與中國大陸不同的歷史，使我們可以在自由的空氣中，關注和支持中國向民主自由的體制奮進，我們有過楊衢雲、孫中山、黃花岡烈士，他們都 在香港醞釀革命，我們為抗日戰爭輸血，為反對國民黨專政的共產黨人掩護，今天，我們也會義無反顧地支持內地的愛國民主運動，不管時間有多長，不管代價多 大，我們也會讓支持民主的薪火相傳。這是香港人的人格。

面對專權政治的高牆，環顧「得錢多助」的世界，我們不僅孤獨，而且毫無勝算，但正如村上春樹所說：「以卵擊石，在高大堅硬的牆和雞蛋之間，我永遠站在雞蛋那方。無論高牆是多麼正確，雞蛋是多麼錯誤。」

講多少歪理為鎮壓開脫都沒有用，批評學生當年過份激情也沒有用，（誰沒有曾經幼稚和不成熟的地方？）不管誰正確誰錯誤，我們只知道一方是擁有所有體制的暴力、宣傳工具、動員能力的高牆，一方是只有靈魂和脆弱軀殼的雞蛋。這就是事實的全部。

有沒有勝算，有沒有利益，甚至有沒有效果，都不是香港人考慮的。從一百多年前楊衢雲時代至今，香港人就沒有考慮過這些。除了那幾個不是流着香港血的小丑。

http://blog.wenxuecity.com/blogview.php?date=200905&postID=44094

有 个不曾见面的朋友，在ＭＳＮ上让我写篇关于六四的文章．六四这个事情，我其实不愿意谈太多，因为想起那些死去的同龄人，心里就分外的沉重，那样美好的年 华，怀着那样满腔的爱国热情和悲愤，为了这个国家的未来和自己的理想，献出了自己宝贵的生命．有时候，看到有些人不论出于什么样的目的，污蔑那些死去的年 轻人的时候，心里对自己的国家和民族，总有无限的悲凉．连袁木都不愿承认的事，难道仅仅为了一口饭吃，为了几毛钱，就这样污蔑那些死去的年轻人？有些事情 可以不做，有些话，可以不说，但是不能丧失最起码的做人的立场．

万 事悠悠，死者为大．何况他们是那样一群热血的年轻人？　作为同龄人，我没有他们那样的勇气，尽管我曾有着和他们一样的热血和激情．为了国家和民族而死去的 人，永远值得他们民族的尊敬．一个民族的进步和生存，就是靠了这样一代代这样热血青年的牺牲换来的．无论是国民党的先驱，还是共产党的先驱，当然，更包括 六四中献出生命的年轻学子．

我 们是一个多灾多难的民族，近一百多年来，已经有太多的牺牲了．我们总不能在国内的政治斗争中，找到妥协的办法，对内的争端，总是不停的诉诸武力和流血．而 夏瑜的故事，也总是在不断的上演．　尽管吃饭很重要，但是良心和良知，以及社会公义和正义，应该比吃饭，乃至生命更重要．你可以不同意他们的做法，但是作 为生者，总该有对死者最起码的尊重．

这个文章，也算是另眼看六四吧．

在 中共的历史上，玩权术的两大高手，一个是毛泽东，一个就是邓小平．但是两个人的水平，实在是差的太多．　一个是玩阳谋，毛泽东发动的所有运动，都是大张旗 鼓，堂而皇之，以人民的名义进行的．　所以，牵扯到毛泽东的事，都有人民背书，这个即使再反对毛泽东的人，也无法否认．　无论他用什么样的手段，他发动的 群动，总有广泛的群众基础．这是他的高明之处．你可以不同意，但是你不能不承认．

邓 则不是，邓的很多做法，更象一个政客，一个军阀．但是邓的最后一招，就是拉上军队和整个党的命运来为自己背书．这就是六四，邓小平对群众，对以人民的名义 做事不感兴趣，他关注的是人性恶的一面，人自私的一面．人利己的一面．人恐惧的一面．从发展经济，到六四镇压．他也成功了．

六 四镇压，他整个把解放军搭进去了．在这之前，解放军是人民子弟兵，无论学生也好，市民也好，没有人会相信解放军会开枪．甚至连３８军的军长，都撂挑子不 干．　因为历史终归是历史．　没有人能掩盖的住，那个三十八军的军长，这样做，不仅仅是处于良知，更是处于对自己军队名声的爱惜．　六四之后，没有人不相 信解放军不会对手无寸铁的学生和市民开枪了．无论你怎么污蔑学生是暴徒，但是事实是，学生并没有武装，没有暴动．更没有先动手．要解决广场的问题，防爆警 察，高压水龙头，催泪瓦斯足够了．就像国民党和北洋军阀做过的一样．但是邓小平一定要动用野战军，为的就是让军队为这事背书．只要一提六四，一定要把解放 军扯进来．为的就是增加翻案的难度，延长平反的时间．一句话，六四这个事情，虽然是我拍板，但是军队和共产党，必须为我背书．想平反，没有那么容易．

六 四之前，学生之所以上街请愿，游行，反腐败，反官倒．是因为，当时绝大多数学生，是受了共产党几十年的教育，相信党，相信政府的．用毛泽东的话说，党为人 民服务，既然为人民服务，那人民的呼声，当然要倾听了．那个时候的人们，相信政府主持正义，相信社会公义，而且，相信真理在政府这边，相信党的领导．但是 枪声一响，多少人的梦想和信心破碎？即使人人都不说话，但是每个人心里都明白．

六四这件事，对邓小平来说，做的越狠，越彻底，翻案的难度就越大．因为整个党，要为这件事情背书了．一旦平反，势必群情激烈．直接威胁到共产党的合法性．威胁到政权的稳定．所以，后来的继承人，没有办法轻易平反和松口．　邓这一招，几乎把共产党自己逼上了绝路．

政 治改革无从进行．在民族主义和爱国主义的旗子的宣传下，民主已经成了西方代理人的同义词．提民主，意味着，混乱，国家解体，和唯西方之命是从．既然不民主 可以高速发展经济，使国家强大，那么乱哄哄的民主，不要也罢．这个想法，在中国人里面，非常普遍．一句话，民主是个烂东西．

六四开枪，使得共产党只能越来越依靠特殊的利益集团来维持自己的统治，官僚系统，国家资本主义，以及军队的支持．维护国家的统治的基础，不是道义和民众授权，而是特殊利益集团和国家机器．　这样绝对不会长久．　

邓 小平动用军队的目的，是不允许有任何党外政治势力的存在，即使是学生也不行．一点的权也不能分．有的人说，学生要分权，要夺权．　军队和政权都在共产党手 里，当时绝大多数中国人都相信共产党的领导的，如何夺权？最多，是有了独立于共产党控制之外的政治势力存在罢了．　这些党外政治势力的存在，注定了要和共 产党争取民心和舆论．鉴于中国特殊的国情．　即使存在，共产党也是占有绝对的优势．报纸，军队，政府，都在共产党手里．至多是，中国人有了另外的政治选 择．政府做事，必须在公众的监督之下，接受公众的批评罢了．共产党不是泥捏的．那些相信学生能轻易夺权的人，不过是太过夸张了，今日回头再看，就当时的学 生领袖的那点水平．就是让他们组个党，自己也会搞散了．共产党何惧之有？

邓小平此举，意在杀人立威，恐吓威慑住中国人罢了．但是，他这么做的结果，要想挽回失去的信任，几乎不可能了．共产党只能往另外一个方向走．那就是统治基础越来越窄，越来越难争取民心．而中国目前的情势，官民的对立和不信任，恰恰证明了这一点．

在政治上，中国人连言论自由都不可能了．因为一旦言论自由，势必导致民间追究六四的真相．中国的宪法规定，公民有言论，集会，结社，出版和游行的自由．网络封锁和言论控制，本身就是违反宪法的．

六 四平反，所牵扯甚多，把军队和党的统治都扯进来，都搭进来．这是邓小平最狠的地方，毛泽东做的事情，共产党怎么都好遮过去，因为那是以群众的名义进行的， 要反思，也是整个民族的反思和过错．几乎人人有份，比如文革．六四则明显的不同．六四这跟敏感的神经，只能一直绷下去．　共产党内，不会有人拿党的前途和 军队的反对来搞什么平反．

所 以，六四平反这个事情，一定会是件艰难和漫长的．它只能是后共产党时代的事．而且，我劝那些要民主，要为六四平反的人，不妨从维权开始，从最基本的要求言 论自由开始．而且我敢说，一旦言论自由，马上就会危及共产党在中国的统治，六四最直接的一个后果，就是，在中国，争取可怜的，基本的言论自由都不可能了．

邓这一手，使自己彻底的和党的命运，军队的声誉和作用捆绑在一起了．要想平反六四，难上加难．

而且，中共统治的合法性，越来越和经济发展联系在一起了，而不是道义上的正当性了．因为很多人为六四镇压辩护的借口，就是中国经济的巨大发展，中国的稳定和没有分裂．可是这些年，我们付出的环境和道德代价，又有多大呢？这期间，又积累了多少的社会矛盾和对立呢？

中国的军队，已经不可能对外轻起战端了．战争会导致军队的作用升高，会影响经济，也会导致国际贸易的萎缩．不可避免的会引起国内矛盾的激化．所以，中国在外交和对外的领土争端上，只能高喊和谐世界，对内也一样．江泽民时代，想硬，也不敢硬，忌讳太多．

六四是邓小平为中国挖的一个大坑，无论谁当权，都避不开．也直接影响到中国的内政和外交，没有六四．中国的言论自由开放不会那么难，因为六四是中国，也是中共的致命伤，任何言论自由，都会使人想起那段惨烈的历史．

他自己走了，骨灰都不曾留下．他留下的这个坑，这个伤，后人还得继续面对．无论拥共的，反共的，都得面对这段自己民族和国家的历史伤痛．　

邓 小平，是负责任，还是不负责？　一个有战略眼光的政治家，是不会喊实用主义的黑猫白猫论的，政府统治的基础，不仅仅是利益，更多的是道义上的正当性．同 样，一个有远见的政治家，也不应该轻易说，摸着只头过河这样的话的，在河里摸石头的时候，也极有可能摸到鳄鱼．一个有远见的政治家，应该给国家指明方向， 而不是给后人留下难题．

任何为六四平反的做法，都牵扯深众．六四动用野战军，是邓小平的一场豪赌．赢了一时，注定输了历史．

六四给中国留下了太多的后遗症，也给中共自己，背上了一个十字架．因为历史，毕竟是历史，政党和政府是一时的，国家和人民才是永久的．　

写的此处，有些无言．　中国的未来，注定了不会平稳．　一个政权，如果深得民心，怎么会担心别人演变和夺权呢？　

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YouTube - War of Resistance for 20 Years
  

Civil Liberties Within Limits After 12 Years of Beijing Rule

HONG KONG — It was a raucous display of free speech outside Hong Kong’s Legislative Council last week: construction workers demanding increased spending on public works, retirees agitating for heftier pensions, and legislators, wearing black T-shirts printed with tanks, calling on the Beijing government to apologize for the bloodshed in Tiananmen Square two decades ago.

In the 12 years since it passed from British to Chinese rule, Hong Kong has remained a bastion of civil liberties unknown in mainland China, under an arrangement dubbed “one country, two systems.”

The result has been the continuation of a freewheeling press, an independent judiciary and a well-oiled bureaucracy. On Thursday, tens of thousands are expected to turn out for a candlelight vigil in Victoria Park here to commemorate the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, in which hundreds of students advocating democracy were killed. In the rest of China, any mention of the events at Tiananmen Square has been banned in the news media or public discourse.

But many democracy advocates and civil libertarians here are increasingly anxious about whether laissez-faire Hong Kong can maintain its independence from Beijing’s authoritarian grip and its distinct identity as an amalgam of Western and Chinese sensibilities.

Last year, Beijing postponed direct elections — to 2017 for the chief executive and 2020 for the full legislature — and its critics say China is wielding a heavier hand in Hong Kong’s affairs.

A growing roster of overseas visitors whose politics irritate Beijing have been denied entry to Hong Kong, and pro-China legislators have blocked efforts to include an uncensored account of Tiananmen Square in high school textbooks.

Longtime advocates of democracy like Martin Lee warn that China is chipping away at Hong Kong’s autonomy by fiat or by co-opting business leaders and politicians.

On Saturday, Mr. Lee, the founder of Hong Kong’s Democratic Party, disclosed that he had been the target of an assassination plot that he said the authorities foiled last August. He said the men were arrested not long after he wrote an editorial accusing China of failing to live up to its pledge to improve human rights.

“If you throw a frog into boiling water, it will jump out right away,” Mr. Lee said during an interview in his office overlooking the High Court. “But if you put the frog in warm water and cook it slowly, it doesn’t jump. We are being slowly cooked in Hong Kong, but hardly anyone is noticing.”

Mr. Lee and other democracy advocates have worried for years about Beijing’s expanding influence here. But in advance of the 20th anniversary of Tiananmen — and of the July 1 anniversary of Hong Kong’s return to China in 1997 — they are concerned about a new willingness by public officials to openly back the mainland’s view. They say that is a jarring development in a city where a million people took to the streets in the summer of 1989 and where protests have been held every June 4 since then.

When asked last week if he supported exonerating the students who occupied Tiananmen Square, Hong Kong’s chief executive, Donald Tsang, told legislators that the episode was best forgotten. “This is something that happened a long time ago,” he said. “The national economy has grown and brought prosperity to Hong Kong.” He added that he thought his view “represents the opinion of Hong Kong people in general.”

Other local officials aligned with Beijing have gone further, claiming that no one died during the crackdown, or that an armed response was warranted because student leaders were planning to kill government soldiers. And this spring, Ayo Chan, the president of Hong Kong University’s student union, obliquely blamed the protesters for provoking the violence in Tiananmen.

Such statements do not go unchallenged, however. Angry students promptly voted Mr. Chan out of office, and Hong Kong’s chief executive was forced to apologize. A poll by Hong Kong University last week suggested that public sympathy for the Tiananmen protesters was high, with nearly 70 percent of Hong Kong residents saying the Chinese government had erred in its handling of the demonstrations.

But those who closely watch the political culture here say reunification with China has begun to slowly alter Hong Kong’s unique ethos, even if the changes are hard to quantify and support for democracy is still strong. Numbers tell part of the story: a decline in the number of Western expatriates — about 100,000 fewer since 1997 — coinciding with a growing presence of mainlanders.

Last year, nearly 17 million mainland Chinese visited Hong Kong, compared with just over 2 million in 1997. Shifting demographics have had an even greater impact on local universities. More than half the postgraduate students studying here are from the mainland, up from barely one-third in 2003.

Like many other entrepreneurs here, Ronnie Chan, a billionaire whose company, Hang Lung Properties, has expanded into the mainland, argues that Hong Kong can flourish only through closer ties to China. In an interview last week, he said Hong Kong was far freer today than it ever was under the British. If anything, he said, society could use a bit more restraint, especially when it comes to the media. “People were afraid the media would be curbed, but it’s gone wild and become irresponsible,” said Mr. Chan, 59, who attended college and graduate school in the United States.

Groups like the Hong Kong Journalists Association take a different view, saying the number of media outlets willing to take on topics that might anger Beijing has been shrinking. Mak Yin-ting, a freelance journalist and former chairwoman of the association, said the owners of more than half of Hong Kong’s media outlets — many of whose owners have business interests in China — have been given advisory posts to the National People’s Congress and People’s Political Consultative Conference, which rubber-stamp decisions made by the Communist Party.

  I like this new video esp the song.  Great job !

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Talking about YouTube - 「六四」二十年我們不敢忘記